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RAISING THE BAR: BROWN AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY 
ANDERS WALKER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When we think of the impact that Brown v. Board of Education1 had on 
American history, we tend to think of the role that it played in desegregating 
southern public schools, inspiring the civil rights movement, or inciting 
massive resistance.2  And yet, Brown had other consequences as well, some of 
which registered not on the terrain of education or civil rights, or even massive 
resistance per se, but rather on the structure of the southern political apparatus.  
This Article will examine the intersection between Brown and a central 
component of that apparatus, the southern judiciary, including both the 
southern bar and the courts.  Two states, South Carolina, a traditionally 
conservative Deep South state, and North Carolina, a traditionally moderate 
and progressive state, will be used as examples of how Brown catalyzed 
innovations in political and, in particular, judicial technology. 
In discussing these two states, this Article will seek to broaden 
understandings of Brown by looking at the ruling not simply as a fulfillment of 
America’s Constitutional promise to African-Americans, but as a destabilizing 
influence on the southern legal order.  Many white southerners, particularly 
lawyers, viewed Brown not as an isolated case, but rather as the culmination of 
a series of cases handed down by the Supreme Court during a period of almost 
two decades.  This trend, many southern lawyers believed, began in 1937 when 
the Supreme Court abandoned its laissez-faire stance toward private industry 
and endorsed the New Deal, a shift that compromised the autonomy of 
southern legal and professional elites, both in terms of economics and civil 
rights.  In response, southern attorneys, and in particular leaders of the bar, 
increased the ethical requirements of legal practice, cleaned up localized and 
informal judicial mechanisms, and removed oversight of the southern judicial 
 
* Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Police Science, and Criminal Justice Administration, 
John Jay College of Criminal Justice. 
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2. For a recent synopsis of Brown’s impact on these factors, see JAMES T. PATTERSON, 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 
(2001). 
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apparatus from the legislature, placing it firmly in the hands of centralized, 
state supreme courts. 
Many of these strategies bore direct implications for African-Americans.  
Perhaps most notable among them were provisions raising the ethical standards 
of the practice of law, particularly prohibitions on barratry that sought to 
undermine lawyers working for the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP).  Other provisions, namely the centralization of 
state court systems and the professionalization of the judiciary, attempted in 
part to improve the image of the law in black eyes, not to mention the 
operation of the law on black bodies.  This marked a strategic concession on 
the part of southern states, one designed in part to arrest the hemorrhage of 
state power to the federal government through civil rights actions, even as it 
reduced the fervor of black calls for justice and social change. 
These shifts, from the perspective of statecraft, constituted an effort to 
control from below a legal system that could not be controlled from above.  
Unable to influence the United States Supreme Court, southern lawyers sought 
instead to discipline their own ranks, to improve the quality of their judges, and 
to eliminate vagaries in the southern judicial process.  This not only bolstered 
the image of the law in the South, but complicated the degree to which the law 
could be used as a modality for furthering subaltern agendas like civil rights.  
As the federal judiciary took increasing liberties with state law, southern 
lawyers took fewer liberties with the way in which they allowed that law to be 
practiced. 
They also placed less faith in the autonomous, and often arbitrary, power 
of localized, county elites.  Throughout much of southern history, state politics 
had been dominated by rural elites, often headquartered in heavily black 
plantation counties.3  These elites resisted change, hampered industrialization, 
and insisted on maintaining strict levels of localized discipline and control over 
African-Americans.  This was often marked by lapses in attention to the 
constitutional rights of black people, not to mention abuses of judicial 
authority in general. 
Following Brown, attempts to reign in rural counties intensified, in part 
through attempts to clean up the southern judiciary.  Although these shifts bore 
direct implications for African-Americans, they extended beyond the struggle 
against integration into questions of industrialization, state autonomy, and the 
evolution of the southern legal apparatus.  It is important to note here that up 
until the 1960s, the South was largely a region not only of de jure segregation, 
but also of localized, idiosyncratic judicial mechanisms that, like Jim Crow, 
represented archaic, Nineteenth Century legal technologies.  Brown, in 
addition to sounding the death knell of the color line, intensified southern 
 
 3. See generally V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS (1949). 
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efforts to modernize these technologies, and in particular to centralize, 
professionalize, and unify its judicial machinery. 
The role of African-Americans in catalyzing this process was a critical 
one.  After all, the vast majority of civil rights cases leading up to Brown, 
which southern lawyers viewed correctly as a threat to their power, were 
argued by black lawyers.  Not surprisingly, southern states attempted to 
undermine these lawyers, even as they sought to make good on claims that 
they did not discriminate against African-Americans.  This Article will begin 
its analysis of both North and South Carolina with examples of attempts to 
undermine black civil rights, using these examples as entry points from which 
to analyze larger shifts in the southern legal order. 
II.  PROFESSIONALIZATION IN THE PALMETTO STATE 
Three years before the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Brown, 
South Carolina established a special committee to deal with the possibility of 
court-ordered desegregation in the state.4  This committee, inspired by the 
NAACP’s challenge to segregated schools in Briggs v. Elliott, was officially 
named the South Carolina School Committee yet became popularly known as 
the Gressette Commission after Marion Gressette, the state legislator who 
chaired it.5  Gressette, a lawyer and active member of the State Bar 
Association, employed one of South Carolina’s most prominent attorneys, Bar 
Association President David W. Robinson, to advise him on legal matters.6  
With Robinson’s help, Marion Gressette devised myriad strategies of 
circumventing Brown and neutralizing social unrest, many of which revolved 
around shifting distributions of power within state government.  For example, 
one strategy adopted by the Gressette Commission was the centralization of 
law enforcement authority around the governor, an idea that Gressette got from 
Florida.7  Gressette wrote to David Robinson in January 1957: 
I should like the Staff to consider preparing draft of a bill authorizing the 
Governor of the State to suspend operation of any public utility whether 
 
 4. David W. Robinson, Manuscript, Brown v. Board Revisited, at 9, microformed on David 
W. Robinson Papers, Reel 2 (on file with University of South Carolina School of Law, Columbia, 
South Carolina) [hereinafter DWR Papers]. 
 5. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 530 (E.D.S.C. 1951), vacated by 352 U.S. 350 (1952).  
For a discussion of Briggs and how it formed one of the five cases that eventually became Brown, 
see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 315-66 (1977). 
 6. David W. Robinson was asked to act as counsel for the Gressette Committee, officially 
known as the South Carolina School Committee, in 1955.  Memorandum from David W. 
Robinson, The South Carolina School Committee (Gressette Committee) (May 3, 1983), 
microformed on DWR Papers, supra note 4, at Reel 1. 
 7. Letter from L. Marion Gressette, to The Honorable David W. Robinson (Jan. 2, 1957), 
microformed on DWR Papers, supra note 4, at Reel 2. 
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privately owned or not which would be similar to the law enacted by the 
General Assembly of the State of Florida.  It occurred to me that we should 
have such a law in South Carolina for use on the part of the Governor in an 
emergency arising from race or other trouble.8 
The centralization of state power around the governor proved appealing to 
Gressette, in part because it created the opportunity for quick responses to local 
unrest, even as it undermined the autonomy of local elites.  Local elites, 
particularly in heavily black counties like those in South Carolina’s eastern low 
country, tended to be more radically racist than less-racialized counties in the 
central and western portions of the state.9  This radicalism made them less 
concerned with adhering to professional standards of law enforcement, and 
more prone to putting down black unrest with a heavy hand, thereby drawing 
unwanted federal attention to the state.10 
To stem such conflagrations, an all-encompassing provision in the bill 
authorized the governor “‘to take such measures and to do all and every act 
and thing which he may deem necessary in order to prevent violence or threats 
of violence to the person or property of citizens of the state.’”11  Specifically, 
“[t]he bill would give the governor power to ‘order any and all law 
enforcement officers of the state or any of its subdivisions to do whatever may 
be deemed necessary to maintain peace and good order.’”12  Like its antecedent 
in Florida, the South Carolina emergency powers act aimed to control whites 
as well as blacks.  “The Ku Klux Klan,” noted Columbia’s foremost 
newspaper, The State, “could be controlled in its meetings by provisions in the 
bill which would give the governor authority to issue an emergency 
proclamation ‘when in his opinion the facts warrant . . . because of unlawful 
assemblage, violence or threats of violence, a danger exists.’”13 
As the Gressette Commission sought to centralize power around the 
governor to deal with potential unrest, so too did it seek to hamstring the 
 
 8. Id.  The end result of this was the creation of the South Carolina Law Enforcement 
Division (SLED), a centrally controlled agency that investigated racial incidents and sought to 
neutralize unrest. 
 9. In his epic study of southern politics, V.O. Key, Jr. describes the geographic breakdown 
of racial attitudes in South Carolina, distilling it into a struggle between the Piedmont and the 
Low Country.  See KEY, supra note 3, at 135-42.  This is not to say that racism did not exist in 
the Piedmont.  See Timothy B. Tyson, Dynamite and “The Silent South”: A Story from the 
Second Reconstruction in South Carolina, in JUMPIN’ JIM CROW: SOUTHERN POLITICS FROM 
CIVIL WAR TO CIVIL RIGHTS 275-97 (Jane Daily et al. eds., 2000). 
 10. For more on the interrelationship between media coverage and police procedure, see 
Anders Walker, The Ghost of Jim Crow: Law, Culture, and the Subversion of Civil Rights, 1954–
1965 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author). 
 11. Broad Powers on Buses Proposed for Governor, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 1, 
1957 (quoting from the segregation committee bill). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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NAACP’s battle in the courts.14  On January 3, 1957, Marion Gressette 
announced a joint meeting of the South Carolina School Committee to consider 
drafts of segregation bills, one of which called “for the investigation by the 
Attorney General of organizations promoting or inducing litigation.”15  
Another called for the criminalization of barratry.16 
Barratry, an archaic crime dating back to Seventeenth Century England, 
referred to the fomenting or stirring up of frivolous lawsuits.17  The NAACP, 
white southerners like Gressette correctly believed, actively sought to stir up 
cases around which it could build legal campaigns targeting Jim Crow in the 
federal courts.18  By authorizing investigations into the NAACP and charging 
its attorneys with unethical practices, the Gressette Commission hoped it could 
neutralize civil rights litigation in the state. 
Marion Gressette later described, somewhat disingenuously, his hope that 
the barratry statute might also prevent violence.  “Frequently I have colored 
people call at my office,” claimed Gressette in 1959, “and they are frank in 
saying that they do not go along with the NAACP and other misguided 
associations and individuals for integration of the races.”19  According to 
Gressette, African-Americans in the state were happy with the idea of 
equalizing black facilities, and did not endorse integration.20  Instead of 
supporting civil rights, they were “the victims of a system of intimidation and 
 
 14. Robinson noted that in South Carolina: 
The [Gressette] Committee also served as a sounding board for the many persons in South 
Carolina who desired to take violent and unwarranted recourse against this change in our 
way of life.  The Committee heard everyone who wanted to be heard.  It used its influence 
with considerable success to persuade people of position and of standing to limit their 
opposition to the school decisions to lawful means.  It assisted in the preparation of an 
interposition resolution in the tradition of Madison and Clay, protesting the soundness of 
the Brown decisions but declaring that the State’s opposition would be within not without 
the law. 
Robinson, supra note 4, at 11. 
 15. Letter from L. Marion Gressette, Senator, Calhoun County, to Members of the 
Committee, Legal Staff and Educational Consultant (Jan. 3, 1957), microformed on DWR Papers, 
supra note 4. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Barratry became the crime of stirring up litigation in the Seventeenth Century.  Before 
that, it referred to the purchase or sale of ecclesiastical preferments.  See 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134. 
 18. For accounts of the NAACP’s legal strategies, see KLUGER, supra note 5, and MARK V. 
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 
1936–1961 (1994). 
 19. Address of L. Marion Gressette to the State and Local Officers of the Citizens’ Councils 
of South Carolina (June 23, 1959) (on file with University of South Carolina, Modern Political 
Collection, William D. Workman Papers, Box 20, “Gressette Commission” Folder) [hereinafter 
Address of L. Marion Gressette]. 
 20. Id. 
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oppression such as even the Dark Ages failed to produce.”21  The ultimate 
result of this intimidation, caused by groups like the NAACP, was a 
breakdown in good relations between the races.  A positive relationship 
between black and white, in turn, was instrumental in preventing violence.22  
“This relationship should be encouraged,” continued Gressette, “and I am sure 
you are conscious of its value and will help to promote it so that the State of 
South Carolina can continue to be free and clear of any racial disturbance.”23 
Barratry provided one strategy of preventing racial disturbances by 
thwarting the NAACP.  “In an effort to alleviate” the intimidation of blacks, 
Gressette announced that: 
[A]n old law has been brought to the front known as the crime of barratry, 
which simply means that no person will hereafter be permitted to solicit or 
incite another to bring, prosecute or maintain an action at law or at equity, in 
any court having jurisdiction within this State.  Putting it another way, no 
person without or within the State can solicit or prevail upon another person to 
bring an action in any Court having jurisdiction in the State of South Carolina.  
This will prevent organizations such as the NAACP from promoting lawsuits 
and inciting members of the colored race to bring suits for any purpose in the 
State of South Carolina.  Any corporation or unincorporated association found 
guilty of the crime of barratry shall be forever barred from doing any business 
or carrying on any activity in this State and shall be subject to a fine of not 
more than $5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than two years or both.  We 
think this law will have a wholesome effect on those who would incite and 
foment trouble among the good colored people of the State of South Carolina.  
We feel that we owe them this protection and this law will be strictly enforced 
in order that they may be protected against our common day carpetbaggers and 
scalawags.24 
South Carolina was not alone in raising the bar as a means of attacking 
modern-day carpetbaggers and scalawags.  In fact, Georgia, Mississippi, 
Tennessee, North Carolina and Virginia all enacted strict barratry provisions as 
a means of eliminating NAACP lawyers in the wake of Brown.25  These 
provisions, although effective while they lasted, eventually fell under the axe 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Address of L. Marion Gressette, supra note 19, at 9. 
 25. For a description of these laws, see Race Relations Law Survey, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 
881, 892-94 (1957).  Mark Tushnet discusses the resurrection of barratry as a means of resisting 
Brown, particularly in Virginia.  See TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 272-82.  Susan Carle also 
discusses the deployment of ethics standards, particularly barratry, against the NAACP.  See 
Susan D. Carle, From Buchanan to Button: Legal Ethics and the NAACP (Part II), 8 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 281, 298-307 (2001). 
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of Supreme Court review in 1963.26  However, they coincided with more 
subtle, systemic changes in the southern legal structure that provide clues into 
the role that Brown played in transforming the South’s political apparatus.  For 
example, Marion Gressette’s resurrection of barratry was not his only attempt 
to increase the regulation of lawyers in South Carolina.  In fact, he joined a 
larger effort mounted by the Gressette Commission’s David W. Robinson and 
the South Carolina Bar Association to centralize the regulation of lawyers in 
general.  Together with Robinson, Gressette served on the South Carolina 
Judicial Council, an advisory committee created by the South Carolina Bar that 
recommended removing the regulation of lawyers from the legislature, placing 
it directly in the hands of the state supreme court.27  This bill, effectively 
insulating the bar from the vagaries of the democratic process, gave the court 
investigatory powers as well as the authority to enforce increased standards of 
professional ethics in the state.28 
The state legislature adopted the Council’s recommendations in August 
1957 by approving a bill empowering the state supreme court to promulgate 
“rules and regulations defining and regulating the practice of law, establishing 
rules of professional conduct for attorneys at law, and establishing practice and 
procedure for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys at law.”29  The 
bill, which removed the regulation of lawyers from the democratic process, 
also created boards responsible for screening applicants “for admission to the 
Bar and to conduct investigations into reported violations and hold hearings, 
under rules to be prescribed by the Supreme Court, in cases involving 
discipline, disbarment, suspension, or reinstatement of attorneys.”30 
Davis J. Kerr, David W. Robinson’s successor as president of the state bar, 
endorsed the new bills under the rubric of improving the image of lawyers and 
encouraging respect for the law.  The bar, asserted Kerr, “is not looked upon 
by the general public with the respect and confidence to which it is entitled.”31  
Disrespect for the bar, incidentally, was a problem articulated by lawyers 
across the South as an unfortunate symptom of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Brown.  Even though southern attorneys had no say in the high court’s 
decision, they nevertheless found themselves in the unpleasant situation of 
being public agents of the judicial system, and therefore beholden to 
maintaining its image in the public eye, even as the Supreme Court besmirched 
 
 26. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963).  For accounts of the rise and fall of 
barratry as a means of undermining the NAACP, see TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 272-82. 
 27. Legislature Enacts Statute Authorizing Court to Adopt Practice Laws, S.C. BAR ASS’N 
NEWS BULLETIN, Aug. 1957, at 1. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. President Kerr Sets Out Principal Aims as Bar Association President, S.C. BAR ASS’N 
NEWS BULLETIN, Aug. 1957, at 1. 
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it.  One particularly good example of how this influenced the response of 
southern bar associations to Brown emerged in Virginia in 1956, one year 
before Kerr endorsed the increased regulations of the bar in South Carolina.  
During the annual meeting of the Virginia State Bar Association of that year, 
an argument broke out between lawyers regarding whether they should endorse 
a resolution proclaiming massive resistance to the Supreme Court.32  Some, 
such as Virginia lawyer Alex W. Parker, thought they should.33  Others, such 
as Michael D. Wagenheim, the Chair of the Virginia bar’s Committee on 
Resolutions, did not, arguing that the language of the resolution was too 
severe.34  The resolution asserted that: 
The Virginia State Bar Association calls for the lawyers of all States . . . to 
rally the citizens to total resistance by all proper means against these threats to 
the continued existence of our representative forms of government, and to the 
exercise of all available means of stemming this tide of usurpation of 
governmental powers by the present Supreme Court.35 
The resolution’s mention of a tide of usurpation referred to a widespread 
feeling on the part of southern lawyers that Brown was part of a larger trend in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence encroaching on southern state law that had begun 
in 1937.36  Although many lawyers agreed with this theory, to call for overt 
defiance of the Supreme Court struck many Virginia attorneys as self-
defeating.  “Your Committee,” asserted Wagenheim, “felt that this language, 
as well-meaning as it might be, might be construed by the laymen, by 
implication, as an effort on the part of the lawyers to defy the courts and might 
lead to the undermining of respect for our entire system of judicial 
administration.”37 
Intent on upholding respect for the judiciary, lawyers in Virginia voted not 
to proclaim overt rebellion against the Supreme Court, just as lawyers in South 
Carolina sought to impose increased ethical requirements on themselves.  Not 
that practicing law in South Carolina suddenly became harder than in most 
states in the Union.  On the contrary, the American Bar Association had 
adopted identical standards in 1908, almost half a century earlier.38  Indeed, 
 
 32. Minutes of the Third Day of the 1956 Annual Meeting of the Virginia State Bar 
Association, in VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 38-39 (1956), microformed on Reel 
9, BA.V57 (on file with University of Virginia School of Law) [hereinafter Minutes of the Third 
Day]. 
 33. Id. at 38. 
 34. Id. at 39-40. 
 35. Id. at 39. 
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 49-60. 
 37. Minutes of the Third Day, supra note 32, at 40. 
 38. Specifically, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the 47 Canons of Professional 
Ethics of the American Bar Association (ABA) that had been adopted by the ABA in 1908.  
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South Carolina’s sudden interest in raising the bar suggests that it was catching 
up to national trends, rather than blazing new trails.  In fact, it suggests that 
when confronted with social crisis, South Carolina embraced centralization and 
formalization, moves alien to a state long known for decentralization, localism, 
collegiality, and informal networks.39 
South Carolina also embraced a move away from democracy.  By taking 
the regulatory power of lawyers away from the legislature, it insulated the bar 
from popular control.  This was particularly significant for the Palmetto State, 
in part because it had long been known to exist under what southern historian 
V.O. Key, Jr. called “legislative government.”40  This term referred to the 
dominance of the South Carolina legislature over both the governor and the 
judiciary,41 a position that was willingly compromised during the aftermath of 
Brown, not only by shifting power out of the legislature and into the courts, but 
also into the State’s executive branch via emergency powers to the governor. 
As black equality loomed on the horizon, the role of the state legislature in 
governing the legal process and, for that matter, the legal profession, declined.  
In its place rose the state bar association and the state supreme court.  The state 
bar, much like legislative committees in Congress, provided a policy apparatus 
for the court, thereby enabling lawyers to determine for themselves how the 
justice system would work and who would work it.  The state bar also enabled 
South Carolina to revamp its judicial apparatus, thereby improving its image in 
the public eye.  This was particularly important after Brown, given that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling undermined not just Jim Crow, but the authority of the 
southern legal system in general, an authority that many African-Americans 
already held to be dubious at best. 
By improving efficiency, increasing professionalism, and raising 
standards, the South Carolina bar sought to re-establish the authority of the 
state judiciary.  This promised to help African-Americans in so far as it 
removed many of the vagaries of the judicial process, even as it coincided with 
attempts to keep NAACP lawyers out of the state.  Not simply a strategy of 
resistance, the South Carolina bar’s impact on the judicial apparatus also 
represented an act of accommodation—a means of buying black support and 
neutralizing black activism.  Marion Gressette and David W. Robinson’s work 
on South Carolina’s Judicial Council consequently reinforced their work on the 
South Carolina School Committee, in part by establishing heightened ethical 
 
Canons of Ethics of American Bar Association Adopted for State, S.C. BAR ASS’N NEWS 
BULLETIN, Sept. 1956, at 4. 
 39. Perhaps tellingly, on May 1, 1957, Charles W. Moore, a state senator and Spartanburg 
lawyer, proposed a bill barring out-of-state lawyers from practicing in South Carolina.  Bill 
Barring Out-of-State Lawyers Offered in Senate, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 2, 1957. 
 40. See KEY, supra note 3, at 150-55. 
 41. See id. at 152. 
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standards for lawyers in the state.42  The Council, established by the state 
Supreme Court pursuant to a motion by the Executive Committee of the State 
Bar Association, of which David W. Robinson was president at the time, came 
into being on July 21, 1956, at the height of massive resistance to Brown.43  
Not surprisingly, one of the standards approved by the Council was the 
limitation on barratry, enacted specifically to curtail the NAACP.44  Other 
duties assigned to the Council included: 
“[C]ontinuous study and survey of the administration of justice in this State, 
and of the organization, procedure, practice, rules and methods of 
administration and operation of each and all of the Courts of the State, whether 
of record or not of record, and of each of all the agencies, boards, 
commissions, bodies and officers having and exercising quasi-judicial 
functions and powers.”45 
Once investigated, the state’s courts, and even quasi-judicial executive and 
legislative bodies, would be subjected to increased regulation and reform. 
Marion Gressette justified this increased bid for power by the judiciary at a 
meeting of state and local officers of the Citizens’ Councils of South Carolina, 
a segregationist organization dedicated to fighting Brown.46  “The attitude of 
the United States Supreme Court, a long line of decisions which have been 
accepted as absolutely binding precedents and the abdication by the Congress 
of power held in trust for the people are contributing to our downfall,” 
Gressette told Council leaders on June 23, 1959.47  He continued: 
In the face of this trend, South Carolina has made its position clear.  We are 
not defying the “law of the land” we are fighting for a return to the law of the 
land.  They call us reactionaries and racists, but we are neither.  The true 
reactionaries are those who would subject the law to the whim of those who 
happen to be in power at a given moment.48 
Gressette’s words, a cry to remove law from the vagaries of electoral politics, 
bolstered his recommendations to remove the control of lawyers from the state 
legislature.  Further, they coincided with his efforts to increase the role of the 
 
 42. The establishment of the Council, as well as its membership list, was published in the 
September 1956 edition of the South Carolina Bar Association News Bulletin.  See Judicial 
Council Established by Supreme Court, S.C. BAR ASS’N NEWS BULLETIN, Sept. 1956, at 1. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 45. Judicial Council Established by Supreme Court, supra note 42, at 1 (quoting July 21, 
1956 South Carolina Supreme Court order creating a Judicial Council for South Carolina). 
 46. For works discussing the centrality of the Citizens’ Councils to massive resistance, see 
NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS’ COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND 
RECONSTRUCTION, 1954–64 (1971) and NUMEN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE 
RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S (1969). 
 47. Address of L. Marion Gressette, supra note 19, at 2. 
 48. Id. 
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state bar, a private, non-political organization, in controlling the law.  At odds 
with this mission were not only Brown, but a string of decisions by the United 
States Supreme Court.49  Herein lurks a critical yet often missed component of 
the Second Reconstruction.  White southerners, in particular white southern 
lawyers, did not oppose Brown simply because it demanded the integration of 
southern public schools, but because it marked yet another step in a larger 
encroachment by the Court onto the terrain of state sovereignty.  This 
encroachment did not begin in 1954 with Brown, or in 1951 with Briggs,50 but 
in 1937, with Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.51  That was the message 
Senator and former judge Strom Thurmond of South Carolina delivered to the 
Virginia State Bar Association in 1955.  “As attorneys,” Thurmond told the 
Virginia Bar, “you probably know that in the eighteen years since 1937, thirty-
three previously formulated principles of constitutional law have been 
discarded or overruled by the Supreme Court.  In the preceding 137 years of 
this nation under the Constitution only twenty-nine previously established 
principles were overruled.”52  Thurmond’s mention of 1937 was significant.  
That year, the Supreme Court abandoned almost three decades of 
decentralized, laissez-faire jurisprudence to endorse sweeping federal 
regulations of private industry and the states.53  This shift, which triggered 
nothing less than a revolution on the Court, angered many wealthy, white 
southerners who resented minimum wage laws and the sudden activist, some 
might say even paternalist, emphasis on enforcing government programs and 
civil rights.54 
Consequently, Thurmond was not alone among white southerners in 
framing Brown within the context of the post-1937 jurisprudential shift.  In 
fact, lawyers throughout the South recognized this.  Among them were some of 
the most influential figures in massive resistance, men like Tom P. Brady, the 
intellectual father of the Citizens’ Councils, and James O. Eastland, head of the 
Judiciary Committee in the United States Senate.55  In 1954, one year before 
Thurmond addressed the Virginia Bar, Eastland lamented: 
 
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (giving Congress broad 
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 54. See id. at 234-35. 
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[S]ince 1937 the Supreme Court has overruled 33 earlier decisions.  This is by 
the count of one of the Justices.  Those decisions were the settled law of the 
land; decisions on which rights were vested; decisions on which the people of 
this country had the right to rely.  This record is unprecedented in our history.  
In the 135 years prior to 1937 only 29 cases were overruled, compared to 33 
cases in 16 years.  Such a record obviously reveals an irresponsible Court.  I 
think it shows an incompetent Court.  Such a record shows that the Court 
legislates, and is constantly grasping additional power.56 
Eastland’s assertion that the Supreme Court had, for seventeen years, been 
on a bid for increased power was not entirely untrue.  In fact, since 1937, that 
Court had followed an increasingly interventionary path.  One field in which it 
did this was African-American civil rights.  In 1938, the Court decided 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, a ruling that marked a sea-change in 
judicial attitudes toward blacks by asserting that African-Americans were 
entitled to equal education within their own states and could not be required to 
go to other states to enroll in graduate or professional school.57  In 1944, the 
Court followed Gaines with a ruling agreeing to strike down the white primary, 
a mechanism designed to prevent blacks from voting in primary elections.58  In 
1950, the NAACP achieved its greatest victory yet when the Supreme Court 
ruled that graduate education could no longer be segregated.59 
By 1954, many white southerners realized that the tide of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence was washing against them.  This became evident in a report 
written by Alabama’s Legislative Reference Service in January of 1954, four 
months before Brown was released.  According to the report, five southern 
states had passed legislation to deal with a negative ruling in Brown long 
before May 17, 1954.60  South Carolina and Virginia both passed measures to 
deal with a desegregation ruling in 1952; Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama 
passed similar measures in 1953.61  Contrary to popular belief, Brown was no 
shocker: “Majority opinion,” asserted the Alabama commission in January of 
1954, “predicts that the Court will repudiate the ‘separate but equal’ 
doctrine.”62 
Part of the reason that southern states suspected Brown might be coming 
was that they saw it within the context of other cases, all encroaching on states’ 
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rights.  An example of this emerged in 1956, when ninety-six southern 
congressmen, an overwhelming majority of the southern Representatives and 
Senators in Washington, signed a declaration of opposition to the Supreme 
Court.63  The document, known popularly as the Southern Manifesto, vowed to 
use legal means to subvert Brown, which it framed not as an isolated opinion 
but as the culmination of “a trend in the federal judiciary undertaking to 
legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress.”64  This applied not 
simply to civil rights cases, but to other cases as well—criminal procedure and 
labor cases among them.  Oft-cited examples included Griffin v. Illinois, a case 
releasing an accused criminal from jail because of the failure to provide him 
with a transcript of his trial proceedings65 and Pennsylvania v. Nelson, a case 
nullifying all state laws against treason and sedition,66 among others.  Civil 
rights cases that did not bode well for the South included Mitchell v. United 
States,67 Morgan v. Virginia,68 Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan,69 
Henderson v. United States,70 Shelley v. Kraemer,71 and Hurd v. Hodge.72 
Southern tendencies to view Brown as part of a jurisprudential trend help 
explain attempts to shore up the southern legal system during the Second 
Reconstruction.  Not only were southern lawyers and judges afraid of NAACP 
lawyers, but they feared a larger move by the federal judiciary to limit their 
autonomy and reduce their power.  By raising the bar to the practice of law, not 
to mention increasing the qualifications and regulations placed on state judges, 
the South sought to counter federal encroachment with heightened 
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requirements on who could bring cases and on how those cases would be both 
pled and ultimately decided.  Professionalism emerged as a counterpoint to the 
informal, collegial manner in which judges were selected and cases decided.  
In addition to bringing power out of the hands of backward-looking agrarian 
elites, this helped salvage the reputation of the law in the South, even as it 
made it increasingly difficult for black lawyers to win victories in the courts.  
In the next section, we will see how this bore implications for the trajectory of 
the civil rights movement, even as it inspired transformations of the judicial 
apparatus in progressive, moderate North Carolina. 
III.  RAISING THE BAR IN THE TARHEEL STATE 
On May 17, 1957, exactly three years after the Supreme Court handed 
down its ruling in Brown, North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges introduced 
a bill in the state legislature outlawing barratry.  According to the Raleigh 
News & Observer, the bill “which would stop lawyers and organizations from 
‘stirring up’ litigation, is an invocation of an ancient doctrine to deal with 
today’s most modern problem.”73  That problem was desegregation.  The News 
& Observer asserted that: 
Originally the term meant the sale of church and state offices. . . . The 
interpretation put on the doctrine under the bill introduced yesterday is a 
somewhat new one, now being considered by most Southern states, in an effort 
to stop the NAACP from paying for litigation costs of plaintiffs in civil rights 
suits.74 
The bill, which disbarred any attorney and de-chartered any corporation 
“not actually a party to court cases” that tried to “appeal in or pay for legal 
actions” coincided with a second measure, also designed to cripple the 
NAACP, requiring corporations “engaged in ‘the advancement’ of people on 
the basis of color, race and religion to fil[e] financial information and 
membership lists” with the secretary of state.75  As in South Carolina, these 
measures placed severe roadblocks in the way of African-Americans trying to 
use the courts as a means of advancing their interests.  And yet, Kelly M. 
Alexander, President of the North Carolina NAACP, warned that the bills 
would not put an end to the “clamor for equality” in the state.76  In fact, 
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asserted Alexander, if the NAACP “were injured” by the laws, then the black 
struggle would be pressured to articulate itself in new ways, a warning that 
foreshadowed the movement’s turn from the courts to the lunch counters in 
1960.77  According to Alexander, even if the NAACP was damaged, “the 
Negroes of North Carolina will continue to feel about segregation as they have 
up to this time[;] . . . the opposition might take a different form, but it would 
continue as vigorously as before.”78 
Alexander’s words, like Cassandra’s, fell on deaf ears.  Instead, Hodges 
gambled that, by raising the bar to the practice of law, he would be able to 
neutralize black activism and quell racial unrest in the state.  He also hoped 
that raising the bar would thwart white extremists.  Hodges’s Assistant 
Attorney General, Robert Giles, articulated this when he asserted that the bills 
were necessary because “organizations ‘on both sides’ of the race question 
‘have mushroomed’ and ‘collected a great deal of money.’”79  “The bill would 
apply,” affirmed Giles, “to the NAACP, the Ku Klux Klan and to the Patriots, 
Inc., [an] extreme pro-segregation organization.”80 
The move to neutralize radical groups by raising the ethical bar to the 
practice of law coincided with a larger statewide emphasis on revamping the 
judiciary.  At the North Carolina Bar Association’s annual meeting in 1956, 
Governor Hodges requested that the Bar establish a special committee to 
investigate the court system and recommend ways of improving its 
efficiency.81  In its defense, Hodges lamented “the extent to which at least 
some of the general public has lost its respect for the courts of our State as 
institutions capable of rendering swift and inexpensive justice to the rich and 
poor alike.”82  Hodges’s allusion to the swiftness of the state’s justice system 
referred obliquely to a backlog of cases in North Carolina’s courts that had 
plagued the system for years, even at the local level.  His reference to rich and 
poor marked a more complex problem, one that related in certain profound 
ways to the state’s struggle regarding civil rights. 
During the 1950s, North Carolina adjudicated the vast majority of its civil 
and criminal cases in police courts, or “poor man’s courts,” operated by 
locally-elected justices of the peace.83  These courts were informal, often held 
 
 77. Parker, supra note 75.  For the definitive work on the Greensboro sit-ins, see WILLIAM 
H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE BLACK 
STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM (1980). 
 78. Parker, supra note 75. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Governor Luther Hodges’ Address, BAR NOTES (N.C. Bar Ass’n), July 1956, at 23. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, THE THIRD LOOK: 
A REVIEW OF THE STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE N.C. BAR ASSOCIATION 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1052 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1037 
in unconventional settings like storefronts or fairgrounds, and were notorious 
for being corrupt.84  Much of this corruption stemmed from the fact that 
justices of the peace, or JPs as they were popularly known, were paid based on 
the number of convictions that they secured.85  This fee system helped 
transform JP courts into engines of repression that operated disproportionately 
against the poor, both white and black, thereby compromising the authority of 
the legal system as a whole.86  “Many local governing bodies look upon the 
police courts,” asserted Hodges in 1956, “primarily as a source of income 
rather than a place for the dispensation of justice.  Of course, you and all the 
rest of the State are familiar with the picture presented by our system of 
Justices of the Peace and the antiquated and much-complained of fee 
system.”87  The governor continued, emphasizing the importance of improving 
the efficiency of the court system: “We must continue to improve both the 
efficiency and speed with which litigation is handled in our Superior Courts if 
our courts are to regain the place of respect that they once held in the public’s 
esteem.”88 
Hodges’s interest in the public’s esteem of the courts prefigured his move, 
one year later, to limit the number of NAACP lawyers in the state.  Both 
initiatives sought to bolster the authority of the state, and in particular the law, 
at a moment when that authority was under attack.  After all, 1956 was the 
height of massive resistance to Brown, a political movement that defied both 
the Supreme Court and to a certain extent, the law in general, just as it was a 
year of black, NAACP sponsored challenges to the southern legal order.  
Hodges’s focus on cleaning up the state’s criminal system provided one way of 
shoring up the judicial apparatus without inflaming racial tensions, as did his 
subversion of the NAACP.  Both measures sought to neutralize destabilizing 
forces, whether they be judicial corruption or civil rights activism. 
Hodges’s decision to use the state bar association, rather than an executive 
or legislative committee to investigate the state’s judicial apparatus 
complemented his strategy of managing the integration crisis peacefully.  
Because it was a private organization, the bar appeared apolitical.  And, 
because it was an organization dedicated to improving the quality and integrity 
of the law, it provided a modality for advancing political agendas under the 
guise of doing nothing more than raising standards and increasing efficiency.  
This was particularly important for Hodges’s plan to clean up the police courts.  
After all, the JP system was a pillar of North Carolina’s decentralized power 
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structure, an arrangement favored by rural, often heavily black counties.  These 
counties objected to any form of centralization, fearing that it would shift the 
nexus of power out of their hands and into the clutches of bureaucratic elites in 
Raleigh.  And yet, Luther Hodges, a businessman and a moderate, had little 
patience for the often flagrant abuses of judicial authority that characterized the 
periphery’s treatment of the poor, particularly blacks.  The state bar provided 
an ideal modality for policing the administration of justice at the local level by 
enabling Hodges to veil the centralization of the judiciary, not in terms of 
reducing peripheral power, but in terms of improving the efficiency and equity 
of the courts.  The bar also provided an ideal modality for raising standards to 
both the admission and practice of law, a measure that made it an effective 
weapon against the NAACP and a consequent line of defense against 
increasingly aggressive black demands for civil rights.  Of course, Hodges 
never overtly identified the bar as a line of defense against social change.  
Instead, he liked to claim that the judiciary hovered “above politics,” like an 
angel.89 
Others were not as diplomatic.  In fact, in 1957, the president of North 
Carolina’s Bar Association, W.W. Taylor, Jr., openly confirmed the utility of 
the bar as a modality for thwarting black civil rights.  “For a long time,” 
announced Taylor, “most of us, as individuals, have been deeply concerned 
with the increasing usurpation by the Federal Government of powers 
traditionally reserved to the states, and, with such usurpation, the inevitable 
destruction of the constitutional rights of the states and of the individual 
citizens.  Taylor continued, leveling his critique at civil rights, and stated: 
The legislative action culminating in the Civil Rights Bill [of 1957], the 
executive action at Little Rock, and many startling decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court in the past few years . . . have brought into clearer focus 
the drastic changes that are being wrought in our basic governmental structure 
by all three branches of the Federal Government. 
  There is, in my opinion, only one force in the entire country that can arrest 
the present trends of the Federal Government, and that force is the organized 
bar of this nation.90 
Taylor’s claim that the organized bar provided a line of defense against 
civil rights illustrates an awareness on his part of the bar’s political utility in 
the struggle against Brown.  Further, it recontextualizes Luther Hodges’s 
endorsement of the bar as an apolitical apparatus, suggesting instead that it was 
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an ideal political device, particularly for shoring up a teetering legal system.  
As we have seen, the bar’s ability to facilitate political reconfigurations from 
behind the rhetoric of improving efficiency and standards provided an arsenal 
of possibilities for a governor trying to preserve order and build a barricade 
against encroachments by the federal government onto state law.  Restrictions 
on barratry constituted one such barricade.  The bar’s role as an investigatory 
agency constituted another.  In North Carolina, the investigatory powers of the 
Bar enabled it to play an integral part in the dismantling of the police court 
system.  Although seemingly unrelated to race, this helped the cause of 
moderation in the state, both by improving the fairness of the law and by 
removing power from peripheral counties.  Peripheral counties, particularly 
eastern former plantation counties with high black populations, consistently 
lobbied for overt defiance of the Court, not to mention massive resistance.  
Metropolitan counties like Mecklenburg, the home of Charlotte, and Orange, 
the home of Chapel Hill, struggled to promote more subtle strategies—zoning, 
re-districting, and token integration among them.  Luther Hodges, a business 
moderate more concerned with attracting outside industry than bolstering the 
power of rural elites, pursued such strategies, disparaging massive resistance in 
the process.91 
Consequently, Hodges’s decision to use the state bar as a means of 
centralizing the judiciary, improving the image of the law, and disempowering 
peripheral elites coincided with his larger response to Brown, which sought to 
maintain a curtain of civility around race relations in the state, avoid unwanted 
media attention from the outside, and allow administrative elites in Raleigh 
enough time to reconfigure segregation along facially neutral lines. 
To head the Bar Committee on Improving and Expediting the 
Administration of Justice, as Hodges’s committee came to be called, the 
governor selected J. Spencer Bell, a state senator from, not surprisingly, 
Charlotte, the seat of Mecklenburg County.  Behind Hodges’s decision to 
appoint Bell—and behind him, the bar as a quasi-investigatory arm of the 
state—lurked a not-so-subtle attempt to wrest control of the judiciary from the 
legislature that had itself, because of a disproportionate allotment of electoral 
power written into the state constitution following the Civil War, come under 
the sway of rural plantation counties.  “I would like now to state why we chose 
the North Carolina Bar Association as the agency which would best serve the 
purpose we had in mind,” announced Hodges.  “First, you are not a tax-
supported or an official agency of the State; and therefore, in investigating a 
department of the State, you should not only be free from any political pressure 
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in fact, but also free from any charges of political pressure.”92  That the bar 
was not politically motivated was, of course, untrue, and yet Hodges realized 
that, because it was an independent organization dedicated to improving the 
standards of both the bench and bar, it possessed a certain meta-political aura, 
not to mention an interest in ridding the legal profession of elected, untrained 
officials. 
A. The Bell Committee Report 
The Bell Committee, as Hodges’s bar committee came to be known, 
documented a parade of horribles besmirching North Carolina’s judicial 
system.93  Justices of the peace, not surprisingly, led the procession.  Elected 
by local constituencies, they operated outside the purview of state appellate 
courts and yet handled the vast majority of the state’s criminal matters.94  
According to the Committee’s final report, the JP system was rigged to 
produce convictions, whether the accused was guilty or not.  A summary of the 
report drafted by University of North Carolina’s Institute of Government 
asserted that: 
From its beginning, [the justice of the peace] system has been haunted with the 
tragic flaw that compensation to the Justice of the Peace in criminal cases 
never comes when the person accused is acquitted, and many people feel that 
this fact tends to weight the scales of justice in favor of conviction and against 
acquittal, and waters down the force of the criminal law tradition giving to 
every person charged with crime the benefit of every reasonable doubt.95 
Such a system begged for federal intervention, even as it legitimated black 
claims that state law in the South was corrupt.  To make matters worse, many 
JPs did not work full time, but rather operated as “birds on the wing” with no 
fixed time or place to conduct judicial business.96  According to the Bar 
Committee’s report: 
[T]he part-time justice of the peace tends to business any time or anywhere and 
the records show him trying cases in his own back yard, on his front porch, in 
the rear end of a grocery store over chicken crates, over a meat counter in a 
butcher shop, in an automobile, over the plow handles, in a printshop, in a 
garage, in an icehouse, in a fairground ticket booth, and in a funeral parlor.97 
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William Faulkner could not have devised a more grotesque mechanism for 
administering criminal justice.  According to Spencer Bell, the system 
engendered “too much disrespect for [the judiciary] to be tolerated.”98 
Consequently, Bell’s Committee recommended that fees be fixed, that JPs 
be brought under the umbrella of the state court system and reconfigured as 
permanent district courts where their decisions could be appealed, and that 
they be subjected to an intensive selection process.99  This marked a profound 
shift in what was popularly known in North Carolina as “the poor man’s 
court.”100  The recommendations were a far cry from the complete lack of 
eligibility requirements imposed on JPs in the past.101  In their place would 
emerge district courts, from which appeals could be made to the state supreme 
court.102  The recommendation promised to effect major change, not least of 
which by reorganizing and policing the state’s fourteen hundred-plus lower 
courts that had operated for years as independent units without centralized 
supervision or guidance.103 
The method of selecting lower court judges was also a major shift.104  It 
involved the establishment of judicial screening commissions that would be set 
up around the state and be held responsible for making nominations to fill 
judicial vacancies.105  “The Committee concluded that the administration of 
justice [was a topic] of statewide import rather than a purely local matter, and 
that the officers who dispense[d] justice should not be selected on a local basis, 
or by ordinary political methods.”106  The stated motivation behind these 
changes was, of course, to improve the caliber of judicial appointments.107  The 
effective result, although judicial quality did improve, was to remove the 
power to appoint judges from local political elites and place it instead into the 
hands of the state supreme court.108  In fact, the Bell Committee recommended 
that the state Supreme Court make all final appointments after reviewing 
screened applicants: 
The Committee’s solution is to have the Chief Justice make the appointments, 
from nominations submitted by the resident regular Superior Court judge.  The 
Committee feels that this method should result in a more nearly uniform 
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quality of local judges over the state, and that appointment by the highest 
judicial officer of the State will give to the local office a desirable dignity and 
significance.109 
“We have been extremely fortunate in North Carolina in having an honest 
and reasonably able judiciary,” announced Spencer Bell in 1958, referring to 
the Democratic party’s de facto one-party rule over the state.110  He continued: 
“I believe, in spite of the fact that our judges must run on a partisan party 
ticket[,] . . . we are fast becoming industrialized and the picture can change.  If 
we had an effective two party system[,] our judges would have to become 
active party politicians.”111 
Bell’s allusion to industrialization referred to the increasing numbers of 
voters in urban, cosmopolitan counties, like his home county of Mecklenburg.  
These counties were chafing under the control of rural elites and, like Bell, 
wanted to withdraw power from the periphery.  That judges had been honest 
and reasonable in the past was irrelevant, a bone thrown by Bell to rural 
judiciaries who, if anything, had compromised the integrity of the law through 
lapses in professionalism and ability.  And yet, such flattery helped Bell make 
it seem as if court restructuring would help rural counties by insulating them 
from the increasing electoral power of metropolitan areas, even if the opposite 
was in fact true. 
Not only did the Bell Committee suggest that the state supreme court make 
all judicial appointments, but it advised that the court also be empowered to 
write all procedural rules.112  This expanded the court’s rule-making power 
from those rules that applied only to itself, to those previously written by the 
legislature governing trial courts.113  To augment this increase in the court’s 
power, the judiciary sought to make good on its promise of improving the 
image of the law, not simply by effecting substantive changes in the structure 
of North Carolina’s court system, but by requiring judges to don robes.  Before 
January 1, 1958, superior court judges were not required to wear the black 
vestments.  “On January 1, 1958,” noted Bar President W.W. Taylor, “the 
Superior Court judges, in accordance with the request originating in a 
resolution adopted by this Association at its 1956 Convention, donned judicial 
robes.”114 
The donning of robes, like the centralization of judicial power, sought not 
simply to improve the efficiency of the judicial apparatus, but the image of the 
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law.  As in South Carolina, lawyers in North Carolina exhibited an acute 
concern for the way in which their profession was viewed in the wake of 
Brown.  Bell announced in 1958: 
There never was a time in the history of the world when the democracies 
needed to keep their fences mended more than they do today.  Respect for the 
judicial branch of our government is the bed rock necessity if a government of 
laws and not of men is to prevail.115 
Bell’s penchant for a government of law coincided nicely with his desire to 
increase the autonomy and power of lawyers.  “Reform is coming,” announced 
Bell in 1958: “[T]he question is not whether to reform[,] but [w]ho is going to 
do the reforming—the Bench and the Bar[,] or the people?”116  As in South 
Carolina, fear of the democratic process catalyzed efforts to place the power to 
regulate lawyers in the hands of the state bar and state supreme court.  This 
coincided with efforts to remove control of the judiciary from rural elites, 
improve the image of the law in general and, with restrictions on barratry, 
barricade the gates of justice from blacks, whether they be NAACP lawyers or 
newly enfranchised voters. 
B. Responses to the Bell Committee Report 
Upon its release, the Bell Committee Report attracted considerable praise, 
particularly among lawyers and superior court judges from urban centers and 
heavily white, western counties.  According to Braxton Craven of Morganton, 
located in the western Piedmont portion of the state, “he had failed to find ‘a 
single rotten brick’” in the proposal, “and favored their passage ‘with every “I” 
dotted and every “t” crossed.’”117  Judge J. Will Pless, Jr. of neighboring 
Marion agreed, asserting that appointment “would free judges from political 
obligations which might hamper their administration of justice.”118  Luther 
Hodges also agreed.  On September 4, 1958, the Governor wrote: 
The North Carolina Bar Association study committee, under the leadership of 
Senator J. Spencer Bell of Charlotte has worked diligently and devotedly for 
the past two and one-half years in studying the operation of our courts and in 
formulating proposals for their improvement.  I have said previously that the 
proposals of this study committee seem to me to be sound in principle and 
merit our very careful consideration.119 
Even African-Americans approved of the Bell Report.  In fact, according 
to Dr. John R. Larkins, the one black member of Luther Hodges’s Court 
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Improvement Committee, “All of the individuals and groups with whom I have 
discussed the recommendations to improve courts have indicated an interest 
and expressed a desire to contribute to the improvement of the administration 
of justice.”120  Of course, Larkins spoke primarily to conservative black 
organizations, groups that were unlikely to support radical initiatives in the 
first place.  These included the Northeast District Schoolmasters Club and 
Coastal Plain District of North Carolina Teachers Association, both of whom 
relied on the existence and perpetuation of separate black schools.121 
Despite considerable support, not everyone endorsed Bell’s 
recommendations.  Many charged that the plan would place too much power in 
the hands of the state supreme court.122  This was a matter of particular concern 
to rural elites in the heavily black, eastern portion of the state who not only 
dominated the state legislature, but also enjoyed having a lower court system 
free from centralized oversight and control.  According to Judge Henry 
Stevens of rural Warsaw, in the eastern county of Duplin, “Centralizing the 
judiciary in Raleigh would be a catastrophe . . . I believe all judges should be 
elected . . . [I] see no reason for bothering a system that for nearly 100 years 
has been unimpeachable.”123  Clawson Williams, a thirty-five year veteran of 
the superior court bench from Sanford, south of Chapel Hill, agreed.  “I don’t 
want anyone to ride herd on the judiciary,” he announced: “[T]he 
concentration of tremendous power in the Supreme Court . . . is the beginning 
of tyranny . . . [T]he people should not be deprived of their right to elect 
judges.”124 
Perhaps most vocal of the opponents to the Bell plan was a superior court 
judge named Frank M. Armstrong who charged that the suggestions were 
tailored to appease the North.  Armstrong even asserted at one point “that he 
and other attorneys and judges were ‘sick and tired of people from up North, 
these law professors and theorists from without, suggesting such changes.’”125  
The allegation was, on its face, absurd.  And yet, it revealed the extent to 
which court reform bled into other tensions, among them the rural-based fear 
that centralization coincided with northern domination of the South. 
As lawyers and judges debated the Bell plan around the state, the 1959 
legislative session began, leading immediately to withering fire from rural state 
legislators.  A constitutional study group sponsored by the legislature 
challenged the Bell Committee’s proposal that the state supreme court be 
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granted rule-making power over the judiciary.126  The legislature also opposed 
the appointment of state judges, preferring that they remain elected.127  
Particularly devastating was a move led by John Kerr of rural Warren County 
to torpedo the plan in the state’s House of Representatives.  Kerr, with the help 
of fellow lawmakers, tacked a measure onto the bill that would have required 
placing a limit on the number of senators in the legislature to one per county, 
thereby ensuring rural hegemony in the state.128  This measure, designed to 
counteract the move to disempower the rural periphery that lay at the heart of 
court reform, was torpedoed by populous metropolitan counties in the House, 
thereby sealing the fate of Bell’s proposals in 1959.129 
When the state legislature reconvened in 1961, Bell’s plan received a 
second hearing.130  Over the complaints of critics like Judge Frank M. 
Armstrong, who accused Bell’s court reforms of “setting up machinery for a 
‘potential judicial dictatorship,’” the Committee’s proposals passed.131  North 
Carolina Bar Association President James B. McMillan celebrated the victory.  
“Passage of the Court Bill is probably the most significant development in the 
legal profession in our generation,” he asserted in a message to the state bar 
association in May of 1961.132  Two months later, he alluded specifically to the 
impact that the bill would have on civil rights through, of all things, its 
reformation of the police courts.  He stated: 
It is in the criminal courts and especially in the courts most inferior in 
jurisdiction and competence that the Constitution is interpreted daily and that 
the Bill of Rights is daily honored or abused and that the public at large and the 
individual voter and client get their every day interpretations of liberty and 
Constitution as the lawyers and judges see them.133 
McMillan’s message was clear.  By cleaning up North Carolina’s criminal 
system, the Bar improved its credibility in the field of civil rights.  Without, of 
course, having to actually make concessions to the civil rights movement, it 
turned away from the courts and towards the lunch counters and the streets. 
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Simon E. Sobeloff, Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
articulated other ways in which the court reforms might benefit North 
Carolina’s position regarding civil rights.  “In the past several years,” 
announced the Judge, “in a growing number of cases persons convicted of state 
offenses have resorted to the federal courts claiming that they had been denied 
their federal constitutional rights in the state proceedings.”134  This led to a 
hemorrhage of state power to the federal bench, one that could be stemmed “if 
state courts were to grant hearings to resolve allegations of denial of 
constitutional rights.”135  By paying more attention to civil rights claims at the 
state level, even rights that had little to do with integration, Sobeloff suggested, 
southern state courts could bolster their autonomy and power, thereby 
compensating for southern failures to uphold civil rights in other arenas.136 
Judge Sobeloff’s recommendations, not to mention those set forth in 
Spencer Bell’s report, would finally be enacted four years after the court bill 
passed in 1965, when the state constitution was amended.137  It was the third 
time in North Carolina history that the constitution had been re-examined.138  
The first was in 1776, in conjunction with the founding, the second in 1868, 
following the Civil War and the end of slavery, and the third in 1965, 
following the Second Reconstruction and Brown.139 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Brown catalyzed transformations in the southern judiciary, even as it 
sounded the death knell of Jim Crow.  These transformations occurred in 
conservative states such as South Carolina and moderate progressive states 
such as North Carolina.  They included measures aimed directly at the 
NAACP, like restrictions on barratry, as well as more substantive shifts in the 
configuration of power, away from rural peripheral counties toward the 
metrapole, and away from the legislature toward state supreme courts. 
These reconfigurations provide insight not simply into the rise of 
resistance to integration in the South, but the survival of the southern state.  As 
southern leaders struggled to deal with Brown directly, so too did they seek to 
bolster the state apparatus, particularly mechanisms within that apparatus that 
presented the risk of further heightening popular discontent.  This discontent 
included anger, not only at Jim Crow by blacks or Brown by whites, but at 
corrupt, inefficient, unjust criminal courts. 
 
 134. Address of Honorable Simon E. Sobeloff, in 1961 Annual Meeting Report, supra note 
130, at 19. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Charles Craven, State’s Courts Undergo Third Reform, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
N.C.), May 16, 1965. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1062 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1037 
Southern state bar associations acted as key architects in the clean-up of 
these courts, not to mention transformations in the southern judiciary in 
general.  Bar leaders realized that building integrity and respect for the law 
provided convenient rationales for centralizing authority and removing power 
from peripheral elites, both factors that facilitated moderate political strategies 
of resistance to Brown.  Able to recommend substantive reconfigurations of 
power under the rubric of promoting professionalism and respect for the law, 
the bar provided an ideal modality for removing power from the periphery, 
increasing the regulation of lawyers, centralizing authority around the state 
supreme court, and eliminating corruption. 
Not all of these changes hurt blacks, nor were they caused solely by 
Brown.  On the contrary, the centralization of the judiciary did a great deal to 
raise the professionalism and uniformity of southern courts—a measure that 
helped all southerners, black and white.  Further, many southern lawyers 
viewed Brown as part of a larger trend of federal encroachment onto states’ 
rights—a trend that inspired southern strategists to circle the wagons by 
removing power from peripheral elites, cleaning up the administration of 
justice, and raising the ethical standards of the practice of law.  Beginning in 
the 1930s, it is important to remember, the winds of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence had shifted increasingly against the South, particularly at the 
national level.  By centralizing judicial authority, increasing the regulation of 
lawyers, and removing regulatory authority from the legislative branch, 
southern states created a monopoly around the law, insulating it from the 
vagaries of the electoral process, improving the quality of judicial opinion-
making, and reducing the pool of applicants capable of entering the judicial 
apparatus.  All of these developments might have occurred without 
desegregation, and indeed did occur without desegregation in states outside of 
the South.  And yet, it is the way in which these shifts complemented racial 
strategies that provides clues into the political nature of state formation in the 
region.  This, at the end of the day, is the lesson to be learned from Brown’s 
role in transforming the southern judiciary. 
 
